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COMMONWEALTH V. TWITCHELL :'
WHO OWNS THE CHILD?2
Since 1980,' there have been seven cases4 brought against Christian Scien-
tist parents whose children died because the parents practiced faith healing
and shunned conventional medical treatment.5 On July 4, 1990, Christian
1. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, No. 89-210 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989).
2. See R. SurTON, WHO OWNS THE FAMILY? GOD OR THE STATE? (1986). In
discussing family relationships, Sutton states: "Parents have the authority to educate and
punish the children God has entrusted to them. Parents are simply trustees of what belongs to
God. Their children do not belong to them, nor do they belong to the State. [The children]
belong to God." Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
3. Couple Given Probation in Son's Death: Regular Health Checkups Ordered for Other
Children, Wash. Post, July 7, 1990, at A2, col. 5-6 [hereinafter Couple Given Probation].
4. See State v. King, No. CR88-87284 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. sentenced Sept. 26, 1989) (parents
received three years probation in plea bargain involving death of twelve year-old daughter
from cancer); Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988)
(mother found guilty of involuntary manslaughter in death of four-year-old daughter by men-
ingitis), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989); State v. Glaser, No. A-753942 (Cal. Super. Ct.
judgment of acquittal granted Feb. 16, 1990) (seventeen-month-old son died of spinal meningi-
tis); State v. Rippberger, No. 13301-C (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1989) (parents convicted of
child endangerment but acquitted of involuntary manslaughter in death of eight-month-old
child by meningitis) (cited in Clark, Religious Accommodation and Crimiqal Liability, 17 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 559, 560 n.3 (1990)); Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (parents convicted of felony child abuse and third-degree murder in death of seven-year-
old daughter, who died of complications arising from juvenile diabetes); Brown v. Laitner, 432
Mich. 861, 435 N.W.2d 1 (fifteen-month-old boy died of spinal meningitis), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 326 (1989); State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (eleven-year-old boy
died of complications from diabetes).
5. See, e.g., Hirsley, Beliefs Can Take Some Into Court, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 5, 1990, § 2,
at 8, col. 1. Five of these prosecutions have resulted in convictions, one has resulted in an
acquittal, and one case was dismissed. Couple Given Probation, supra note 3, at A2, col. 6. For
citations to these cases, see supra note 4. In stark contrast to these prosecutions and convic-
tions is "the Delaware Christian Science couple [that] won the right to treat their 3 year old
son's cancer through spiritual healing instead of chemotherapy." Christian Science Care Up-
held in Court, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 1, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. (CHILD), an anti-Christian Scientist group, has
alleged that during the last ten years there have been at least twelve deaths of Christian Science
children that medical treatment could have saved. Firestone, Undeterred in their Faith, News-
day, July 3, 1990, Part II, at 4, col. 1; Margolick, In Child Deaths, A Test for Christian Sci-
ence, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter Margolick]. One news report
estimates that in the past 15 years, more than 140 children have died because of the parents'
belief in faith healing. Colen, Religious Freedom or Child Neglect, Newsday, June 19, 1990, at
13, col. 1. Prosecutors have secured convictions in 19 of 29 criminal cases brought against
parents whose children have died because of their reliance on spiritual healing rather than
conventional medical care. Neuffer, Spiritual Healing: A Debate of Rights, Critics Demand
Accountability for Child Deaths, Boston Globe, May 22, 1990, at Al, col. 4, at 70, col. 2.
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Scientists David and Ginger Twitchell were convicted of manslaughter in
the death of their two-year-old son Robyn.6 The Twitchells relied solely on
prayer to heal their ailing son, believing this to be in his best interest and
believing themselves exempt from criminal prosecution.7 The Twitchells
were sentenced to ten years probation' and their other children were ordered
Recently two Jehovah's Witnesses refused to allow their daughter suffering from leukemia to
receive a blood transfusion. Le Fanu, Second Opinion College Fails the Healing Test, The
Independent, July 29, 1990, at 51, col. 3. In spite of these reports,
[s]tatistics on child deaths from treatable illnesses where parents relied on faith heal-
ing alone are not readily available; a lack of centralized data on child deaths has
prompted Congress to establish a national clearinghouse for such data. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 5104 (West Supp. 1989). This clearinghouse, the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect, was established in 1988 by Pub. L. No. 100-294, the
"Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1988." Id. Con-
gress hopes that the availability of uniform data on youth deaths will dispel the no-
tion that these deaths are merely 'isolated incidents' and will enable officials to
coordinate programs more effectively. 133 CONG. REC. SI 1,718 (daily ed. Aug. 7,
1987) (statement of Senator Dodd).
Comment, When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between a Parent's Right to Free Exercise of Reli-
gion Versus His Child's Right to Life, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 585 n.1 (1989) [hereinafter
Comment, When Rights Clash].
6. Boston Jury Convicts 2 Christian Scientists in Death of a Son, N.Y. Times, July 5,
1990, at A12, col. 3 [hereinafter Jury Convicts]. Defense lawyers have moved for a new trial,
based upon a letter by the forewoman of the Twitchell jury, acting in an individual capacity, to
the Chief Justice ofthe Suffolk Superior Court, criticizing trial Judge Sandra Hamlin's han-
dling of the case. Goodrich, Twitchell Attorneys To Seek New Trial, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Aug. 13, 1990, at 7, col. 4. While this letter may be incorporated in the Twitchells' appeal,
filed on July 5, it will not alter the conviction. Wong, Juror's Claim of Biased Judge Spurs No
Action, Boston Globe, Aug. 11, 1990, at 29, col. 3 (noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has previously ruled that convictions may not be overturned based upon a ju-
ror's dissent after the verdict has been affirmed and officially recorded); Couple Given Proba-
tion, supra note 3, at A2, col. 5 (same). The defense has listed several grounds for appeal: Lack
of due process, based upon the state law exemption allowing parents to rely solely on spiritual
healing; improper instructions to the jury; erroneous evidentiary rulings; and unconstitutional
theological questioning of Christian Science witnesses. Goodrich, Appeals Process Gets Under
Way in Twitchell Manslaughter Case As Defense Seeks Stay of Sentence, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, July 9, 1990, at 9, col. 3.
7. Chambers, Deliberating Faith, Law and a Life, Nat'l L.J., July 2, 1990, at 13, col. 4
[hereinafter Chambers]. "A 1975 opinion by the [Massachusetts] attorney general inter-
pret[ed] the 'spiritual exemption' statute as precluding criminal prosecution of parents for their
failure to 'provide medical care because of religious beliefs.'" Id. The Massachusetts law
states: "A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or lack proper physical care for the sole
reason that he is being provided remedial treatment by spiritual means alone in accordance
with the tenets and practice of a recognized church ...." MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 273,
§ 1 (West Supp. 1989).
8. Couple Given Probation, supra note 3, at A2, col. 5. The Twitchells' lawyer had asked
for four years of probation. Christian Scientists Are Given Probation for Death of Child, N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1990, at 8, col. 5 [hereinafter Christian Scientists Given Probation]. Even critics
agreed that a jail sentence would not "serve the ends of justice. They have already lost a
child." Ciolli, Christian Scientists Will Get Probation, Newsday, July 6, 1990, at 2, col. 2.
Commonwealth v. Twitchell
to undergo periodic medical examinations. 9
Some mistakenly praise Commonwealth v. Twitchell as a victory for chil-
dren's rights.' ° An examination of Twitchell and similar cases, however,
reveals that the issue litigated is not children's rights; rather, these cases test
who has the right to determine the child's best interest-the state or the
parents." Twitchell may set a dangerous precedent. If a court determines
that the state has a compelling interest' 2 in the health and welfare of an
endangered child,' 3 the state can force parents, such as the Twitchells, to
"Although parents who belong to other denominations . . . have gone to jail for failing to
provide their sick children with medical care, no Christian Scientist has thus far." Margolick,
supra note 5, at A11, col. 3.
9. Couple Given Probation, supra note 3, at A2, col. 5. The Twitchells have three other
children: Elias, 9 months, Brian, 2 years, and Jeremy, 8 years. Id.
10. See, e.g., Couple Given Probation, supra note 3, at A2, col. 5-6. "Medical experts
applauded the verdict, saying it would protect children. 'No religion is going to be allowed to
be a defense against abuse and neglect,' said Michael Grodin, a pediatrician and medical
ethicist at Boston University. 'The bottom line is we have to have standards for protecting
children.'" Id.; see also English, Wronged Rights a Tougher Case, Boston Globe, June 25,
1990, at 17, col. 1 ("But the case is larger than one couple[-]there's a public policy issue here,
and that is how to protect children, who are virtual chattels.").
11. Even the Twitchell prosecutor recognized this issue, as evidenced by his remark dur-
ing closing argument: "What religion was the baby?" Daly, Trial on Death of Todler, Faith
Healing Goes to Jury, Wash. Post, July 3, 1990, at A3, col. 5 [hereinafter Trial on Death]. In
addition, the defense attorney argued that "the second issue is whether we will permit or
tolerate the commonwealth to place itself in a very special relationship between a parent and
child and to substitute its own judgment for the parents' judgment." Botsford, They Loved
Their Child; They Also Loved God, The Independent, May 30, 1990, at 18, col. I [hereinafter
Botsford]. Like other cases involving faith healing, this prosecution "represent[s] a clash of
apparent absolutes: [O]f religious liberty and parental autonomy on the one hand and the right
of the states to protect children-and the rights of the children themselves--on the other."
Margolick, supra note 5, at AI, col. 3; see also supra note 2 (children belong to God, not to the
parents or the state).
12. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), the
Supreme Court recently held that the state's interest need not always be compelling. See infra
notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
13. A state's interest in the welfare of a child may allow intervention not only when the
child's life is endangered, but even when the child needs ordinary medical attention. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 3, 8, 633 P.2d 1302, 1303, 1306 (court
ordered child to be separated from parents because child needed treatment for hydrocephalus,
a condition possibly resulting in mental retardation if left untreated despite plea for spiritual
treatment when child's life not threatened), review denied, 291 Or. 662, 639 P.2d 1280 (1981);
see also Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 102-03, 485 N.Y.S.2d
443, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (hospital entitled to provide blood transfusion for baby over parent's
religious-based objections because of state's "vital interest in child's welfare"); In re Cabrera,
381 Pa. Super. 100, 107, 552 A.2d 1114, 1121 (1989) (court granted hospital's petition for
appointment of special guardian to consent to blood transfusion for child suffering from sickle
cell anemia when Jehovah's Witness parents refused to consent to the transfusions because of
their religious beliefs); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 25, 497 A.2d 616, 624
(1985) (when medical conditions threaten a child's life, the duty to seek medical assistance
1991]
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administer conventional medical treatment 14 against their religious beliefs-
without violating either the free exercise clause' 5 or the establishment
clause16 of the Constitution-then the state could also theoretically dictate
to parents of varied religious backgrounds in other areas concerning the up-
bringing of their children.
The role of religion, or of a particular religion, was disputed throughout
Twitchell. Special Prosecutor Kiernan, however, has consistently denied
that the Twitchells were prosecuted for their religious affiliation. 17  A
spokesman for the church disagreed, maintaining that the Twitchell verdict
"reveals a double standard. Although many children die while in conven-
tional medical care ... criminal charges are brought any time a child dies in
overrides the religious beliefs of the parents), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 620, 538 A.2d 874, cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
14. Though beyond the scope of this Commentary, an important question remains: Who
defines the term conventional medical treatment? Would parents who turned to experimental
treatment be prosecuted? See generally Prillaman, A Physician's Duty to Inform of Newly De-
veloped Therapy, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43 (1990) (professional standard of care
necessary to determine the range of medically acceptable alternative treatments).
15. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. Though most often characterized as free exercise cases, these faith healing cases could
also be viewed as establishment clause cases. The important additional danger is that an "ex-
Iception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds," Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972), while in line with the free exercise clause, may violate the estab-
lishment clause of the Constitution. However, the state could also be seen as violating the
establishment clause if they do not grant an exception. If a state does not permit the parents to
direct a child's religious upbringing, the state must, by default, do so in apparent violation of
'the establishment clause. The Court in Yoder addressed this concern directly, stating that "if
the State is empowered, as parens patriae, to 'save' a child from himself or his Amish parents
by requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high school education, the State
will in large measure influence, if not determine, the religious future of the child." Id. at 232.
(emphasis supplied). This argument, no less valid in the Twitchell case, only serves to further
emphasize the tension that exists between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause.
Under current first amendment construction, a court is caught in the ultimate paradox; it loses
no matter what course it takes. However, if an interpretation of the original intent of the
framers of the Constitution is considered, no tension between the two religion clauses of the
first amendment would exist. See generally Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Recon-
structing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989) (advocating a historical
perspective to gain consistency between the establishment and free exercise clauses); Smith,
Getting Off On the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the
Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique,of the Reynolds and
Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984) (similar treatment).
17. Daly, Parents Who Relied on Faith Healing Are Convicted in Son's Death, Wash. Post,
July 5, 1990, at A4, col. 1 [hereinafter Parents Who Relied]; cf. Jury Convicts, supra note 6, at
A12, col. 3 ("We don't contest the right to believe as one sees fit.., but we do contest the right
to practice those beliefs when it affects a two-year-old little boy." (statement of John
Kiernan)).
Commonwealth v. Twitchell
a Christian Scientist's care.""8
This Commentary will provide a brief background on the formation of the
Christian Science Church, the laws designed to exempt spiritual healing
from criminal prosecution, and the facts of the Twitchell case. This Com-
mentary will then analyze the constitutional implications of Twitchell. Re-
gardless of religious beliefs, it appears that parents may be prosecuted
whenever a child's death results from delayed medical treatment. 9 Finally,
this Commentary will conclude that the free exercise clause of the Constitu-
tion2° should protect parents like the Twitchells from prosecution.2'
I. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CHURCH
Mary Baker Eddy founded the Christian Science Church in 1879.22 She
began the religion after choosing to concentrate on prayer rather than con-
ventional medicine to effectuate her own healing following a fall that
knocked her unconscious. 2' Three days after the fall she "had a revelation
about the 'divine principle of scientific mental healing' and subsequently
18. Parents Who Relied, supra note 17, at A12, col. 3.
19. See Children, Compassion, Morality, and the Law, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 19,
1989, at 20, col. 1 (editorial); see also Parents Who Relied, supra note 17, at A4, col. 2 (stating
that the Twitchell verdict is "important because it makes clear that 'every parent has the same
obligation,' regardless of religious beliefs." (statement of John Kiernan)).
20. See generally McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). Professor McConnell argues that the debate
regarding the grant of exemptions under the free exercise clause
has largely proceeded in an ahistorical fashion and has ignored the unique American
conception of religious freedom from which the free exercise clause emerged ....
After discussing early nineteenth-century judicial interpretation, Professor McCon-
nell concludes that an interpretation of the free exercise clause that mandates reli-
gious exemptions was both within the contemplation of the framers and consonant
with popular notions of religious liberty and limited government that existed at the
time of the framing.
Id. at 1409; cf. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Ex-
emption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1990) (arguing that granting a free exercise exemption
from neutral laws creates a number of constitutional problems and analyzing the arguments
advanced in support of, and against, free exercise exemptions).
21. This Commentary does not address all of the current limits to religious freedom. See,
e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990)
(holding that Indians cannot smoke peyote, a religious practice that predates white man's
arrival); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879) (Mormons may not practice big-
amy); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1488 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (Santeria followers may not make animal sacrifices); Whyte v. United States, 471 A.2d
1018, 1019 (D.C. 1984) (Rastafarians not permitted to smoke marijuana in pursuit of their
religious beliefs).
22. Chambers, supra note 7, at 13, col. 3.
23. Boeri, Parents Convicted.: Christian Science Guilty in Son's Death, Newsday, July 5,
1990, at N3, col. 3.
1991]
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wrote a book called 'Science and Health.' ,24 The basic premise of the book
is that by drawing closer to God, one can overcome what Eddy considered
manifestations of the mind, including sin, sickness, and disease.25
Despite this foundational principle of the church, officials of the Christian
Science church maintain that their members are free to choose conventional
medical care without suffering any negative repercussions from church au-
thorities.26  In Twitchell, however, the prosecution and defense differed
sharply on this issue of church orthodoxy.27 Some members of the religion
have said privately that the church "makes them feel as though they have
failed if they [choose conventional medical care.],, 28
There are approximately 2,000 Christian Science churches in the United
States,29 though the church's leaders say they do not keep a record of mem-
bers since they consider the number unimportant. 30 It appears, however,
that the number of members is declining.3' Church officials, however, state
that the Twitchell case has "unexpectedly 'revitalized' interest in Christian
Science teachings, as measured by visits to Christian Science reading rooms
and telephone requests for Christian Science practitioners. ' 32 Stephen Gott-
schalk, an author of encyclopedic entries on Christian Science, believes that
"while people may be thinking more about Christian Science now[,] what
they are thinking may be more hostile than helpful to the movement."
33
Out of all the members of the church, there are an estimated 3,000 practi-
tioners34 who "devote themselves full time to a healing ministry after they
have shown the church evidence of effective healing, good character and a
readiness to meet the challenge[s encountered in faith healing]." 35 Christian
Scientists believe:
[S]piritual healing doesn't happen automatically. There have been
failures like the death of Robyn Twitchell. When failures for chil-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Parents Who Relied, supra note 17, at A4, col. 5.
27. Trial on Death, supra note 11.
28. Higgins, Trial Spotlight Catches Christian Science in a State of Flux, Boston Globe,
July 22, 1990, at 30, cols. 1 & 4.
29. Id. (There are another 700 Christian Science churches outside of the United States).
30. Boeri, supra note 23, at N3, col. 2.
31. Botsford, supra note 11, at 18, col. 6. Andrew Hartsook, a Christian Scientist facing
excommunication for publishing a newsletter critical of the church hierarchy, reported that
"120 Christian Science churches have closed in the United States since February 1987, leaving
a total of 1,863 American churches." Higgins, supra note 28, at 30, col. 2. Hartsook also
reported that 12 new churches were added during that period. Id.
32. Higgins, supra note 28, at 30, col. 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Boeri, supra note 23, at N3, col. 2.
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dren occur, that makes news. But the real news-that consistent
spiritual healing goes on happening-is news you don't hear much
about, though the cumulative evidence for it is enormous.3 6
Independent research, however, may not support this optimism. A mathe-
matician, comparing the life expectancy of Kansas State alumni with the life
expectancy of Principia College alumni, the main institute of higher educa-
tion for Christian Scientists, found the life expectancy of Christian Scientists
to be shorter than that of their secular counterparts.37 This research shows
that from the classes of 1934 to 1948, the graduates of Principia College had
a consistently higher death rate: 73% were alive, compared to 80% of Kan-
sas State University graduates.38 However, another comparison between
Christian Scientists and the general population reported the following figures
of deaths per year: 23 per 100,000 for Christian Scientists and 53 per 100,000
for the population in general.39 Whatever the effectiveness of Christian Sci-
ence faith healing, the medical costs of enlisting the services of a Christian
Science practitioner are nevertheless tacitly acknowledged through reim-
bursement by Medicare and insurance companies, and are deductible from
federal income tax.'
Forty-one states have enacted medical practice acts4' that regulate the
36. Gottschalk, Speaking Out: Should Government Rule when Faith, Science Clash?; Con:
Critics Ignore Important Evidence of Spiritual Healing, L.A. Times, July 14, 1990, at F16, col.
5 (emphasis in original).
37. Le Fanu, supra note 5, at 51, col. 3.
38. Id. These percentages are faulted for underestimating the benefits of modem
medicine, since Christian Scientists "would have been non-smokers and teetotallers-and
would therefore have the advantage of being protected from the two major causes of early
death in our society." Id. The study cannot be considered dispositive, though, since the fact
that Christian Scientists do not seek medical treatment does not demonstrate any causation
between their abstinence from medical treatment and annual mortality.
39. Jones, Prayers, Parental Duty: Child Deaths Put Faith on Trial, L.A. Times, June 27,
1989, at 1, col. 1, at 16, col. 3.
40. Larrabee, Christian Scientists Contend "Prayer Is Being Prosecuted, "USA Today, July
5, 1990, at A3, col. 3. See generally Parents' Faith, Children's Lives, Wash. Post, July 7, 1990,
at A22, col. 1. "Many state Medicaid programs and most large insurers reimburse Christian
Science Practitioners as they do doctors. Private payments to practitioners are deductible as
medical expenses under state and federal income tax, and Medicare makes payments to Chris-
tian Science 'sanitoriums' as if they were hospitals." Id. at A22, col. 2.
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 34-24-50 to -406 (1985 & Supp. 1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08-
.64.010-.380 (1962 & Supp. 1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1401 to -1455 (1956 & Supp.
1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-80-101 to -98-312 (1987 & Supp. 1989); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 2000-2515 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-36-101 to -136 (1985 & Supp.
1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-8 to -14K (West 1958 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 1701-1795 (1987 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.301-.349 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-34-1 to -46 (1988 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 453-1 to -33 (1988 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 54-1801 to -1841 (1988 & Supp. 1990);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 148.1-.13 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2801 to -
1991]
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medical profession by providing criminal penalties for the unauthorized
practice of medicine. However, religious healers have been exempted from
regulation under most of these acts.4 2 In Twitchell, the prosecution con-
tended that there was a distinction between regulating the practice of Chris-
tian Science medicine and investigating and prosecuting deaths that result
from such practice.43
II. SPIRITUAL HEALING EXEMPTION LAWS
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have laws exempting
Christian Scientists and other faith-healing sects from criminal liability."
2890 (1985 & Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1261-1301 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3263-3299 (1964 & Supp 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch.
112, § 2-12X (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-25-1 to -95 (1972 & Supp.
1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 334.010-.265 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-3-101 to -405 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-101 to -1, 136.09 (1990); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 329:1-30 (1984 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-1 to -27.9 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to -35 (1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (Con-
sol. 1987 & Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-1 to -21 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-17-
01 to -41 (1978 & Supp. 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4731.01-.50 (Anderson 1953 &
Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 481-518 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 677.010-490 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 422.1-45 (Purdon 1968 & Supp.
1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-47-15 to -270 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 36-4-1 to -36 (1986 & Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495-
4512 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-12-26 to -43 (1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1311-1400 (1975 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2500 to -2510 (1988
& Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 30-3-1 to -15 (1986 & Supp. 1990); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§§ 448.01-.40 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 33-26-101 to -410 (1977 & Supp.
1990).
42. Thirty-seven states specifically exempt spiritual or religious healers from liability by
statute, reasoning that the Medical Practice Act should not interfere with the practice of reli-
gion. Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio are the only states that do not list religious healers
under the exemption clause. For a list of the state statues, see supra note 41.
43. This issue, as stated by the Twitchells' defense attorney, is "[w]hether the Constitu-
tion permits parents to be subject to criminal prosecution if there is a statute that explicitly
allows for the care and treatment of a child through spiritual healing." Botsford, supra note
11, at 18, col. 8 (quoting Rikki Klieman, counsel for the Twitchells). The prosecution con-
tended that the exemption provided immunity only for child abuse or neglect, not death or
serious harm to a child. In another Christian Science case, Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
3d 112, 122, 763 P.2d 852, 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 22 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989), the court held that the faith healing exemption at issue did preclude liability for misde-
meanor child neglect, but also held that the exemption did not extend to prosecutions under
involuntary manslaughter and felony child neglect statutes since the objectives of these statutes
differed from the misdemeanor child neglect statutes. For a more thorough analysis of the
Walker opinion, see Comment, When Rights Clash, supra note 5, at 598-602.
44. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(d) (1990); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 12-12-502(3) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-
6-101 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1104 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1356 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(8)(f) (West
Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(S)(1) (Supp. 1990);
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These exemptions, however, may not be "deeply entrenched in the common
law,"4 5 and in some states the statutory exemption is only a few years old."
Most often these exemptions were enacted after Christian Scientists, among
others, lobbied state assemblies.4 7 Exemptions usually cover a variety of
religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses.48 Most of the criminal
liability exemptions were based upon a 1983 federal law, since repealed, re-
quiring states to incorporate religious immunity provisions into their child
abuse laws.49 This 1983 law was apparently steered through Congress by
two Christian Scientists.5°
Despite repeal of the federal statute, most state exemptions remain, even
in the face of criticism. The medical community,5 ' children's advocacy
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4(a)
(Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.68(2)(c), 726.6(l)(d) (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3608(1)(c) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (Baldwin 1990); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(5) (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp.
1989); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-701(n)(2) (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
273, § 1(4) (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-105(/)(i), -
105(m) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.5085 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX)(c) (Supp. 1989); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-3(L)(5), -3(M)(4) (Supp. 1989);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.421(A)(1), 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1990 & Supp. 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 846A, 852A (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(1)(e)
(Supp. 1990); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-
11-15 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-157(c) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(C)
(Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-314, -371.1B (1989 & 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.020(3) (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West 1987); Wyo. STAT.
§ 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1990). Five of the above states-Maryland, Montana, Nevada, North Car-
olina, and Tennessee-do not refer specifically to prayer treatment in the statute, but permit
alternative remedial care if that form of treatment is recognized by state law.
45. Chambers, supra note 7, at 13, col. 3, at 14, col. 4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Neuffer, supra note 5, at AI, col. 4, at 70, col. 1.
49. Id. One commentator reports that nationwide adoption of these exemptions coincided
with Congress' enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974. The
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) construed the Act to require an ex-
emption for faith healers, thereby linking the adoption of such exemptions to state eligibility
for federal funds for child protection programs. In 1983 the Department of Health and
Human Services (successor to HEW) removed the religious exemption requirement. Com-
ment, When Rights Clash, supra note 5, at 591-92.
50. Botsford, supra note 11, at 18, col. 5.
51. See Larabee, supra note 40, at A3, col. 4; see also Chambers, supra note 7, at 14, col. 4
(stating that both the American Academy of Pediatrics and individual practitioners tried to
change the laws).
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groups,52 and others are now actively lobbying state legislatures to remove
or revise the existing exemptions. 53 While they hope that the conviction in
Twitchell will be a catalyst for their cause,54 only one state, South Dakota,
has revised its laws since the federal statute was repealed." Efforts to revise
or remove the exemptions have mostly been unsuccessful. Actually, some
states have strengthened the laws protecting spiritual healing.56 Two rea-
sons support the continued existence of the exemptions. First, criminalizing
spiritual healing would make Christian Science parents guilty even if the
children were, in fact, healed through faith healing." Second, most of the
statutes are worded to prevent their use as "a haven for anyone who abuses
or neglects children,"" thus addressing the concerns of child advocacy
groups.
Those seeking to revise or remove the faith healing exemptions must pro-
vide answers to the difficult questions that will arise as a consequence of the
repeal of existing law. For example, if a state repeals the exemption it is
unclear who will pay for expensive medical treatment for a child of a reli-
gious objector when the state compels treatment against the parents' will. It
is also uncertain who will be held responsible if a child dies as a result of the
imposed conventional medical treatment. Most importantly, it is unknown
who will decide when a particular treatment is necessary-the parent or the
state.5 9
The Twitchell case is the first of its kind to be tried in Massachusetts since
1971,' o when the state's Child Abuse and Neglect law was amended to ex-
empt spiritual healing.61 Since 1971, Massachusetts has not changed its spir-
52. See Wong, Christian Science Couple Convicted in Son's Death, Boston Globe, July 5,
1990, at 1, col. 1, at 14, col. 2.
53. Neuffer, supra note 5, at AI, col. 4.
54. Hirsley, Boston Trial Could Affect Illinois Law, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 18, 1990, at CI,
col. 1.
55. Neuffer, supra note 5, at 70, col. 2. South Dakota's statute now provides: "[I]f a child
is under treatment solely by spiritual means, the court may... order that medical treatment be
provided for the child." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (Supp. 1990).
56. See, e.g., Neuffer, supra note 5, at 70, col. 2 (Texas strengthened laws protecting spiri-
tual healing).
57. Hirsley, supra note 5, § 2, at 8, col. 1.
58. Id.
59. Loth, Faith, Science Clash on Child Neglect Proposal, Boston Globe, Apr. 12, 1990, at
1, col. 3. This particular concern was voiced by David Twitchell after the judge pronounced
the Twitchells' sentence. Christian Scientists Given Probation, supra note 8, at 8, col. 5.
60. Several theories have been advanced to describe the motivations of the decision to
prosecute in this case. See Botsford, supra note 11, at 18, col. 2.
61. Neuffer, Verdict Seen as Fueling National Debate, Boston Globe, July 5, 1990, at 1,
col. 1, at 14, col. 5. Before the 1971 amendment was passed, "jurors in Barnstable, Mass., [(in
1967)] held Dorothy Sheridan, a Christian Scientist, criminally responsible for the death from
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itual healing laws, despite lengthy debate.6 2 As the legislators in
Massachusetts gathered in April 1990 to discuss the fate of their faith heal-
ing exemption, some cautioned that removal of the exemption would take
"the choice away from the parent and [have] a chilling effect on the practice
of Christian Science." 63 One state representative suggested that it might be
"'chauvinistic' for medical science to declare its methods more effective
than prayer."4
III. FACTS OF THE TWITCHELL CASE
Robyn Twitchell died on April 8, 1986 of a bowel obstruction.65 When
Robyn first became ill five days before his death, his parents called a Chris-
tian Science practitioner who prayed with the Twitchells for Robyn's recov-
ery.66 A church nurse also attended Robyn during his illness through
prayer.67  An inquest report by a district court judge stated that both the
practitioner and the nurse, as well as Nathan Talbot, a spokesman for the
church, had "contributed" to Robyn's death by discouraging David and
Ginger Twitchell from seeking conventional medical treatment.68
The visible condition of Robyn's illness was a central issue in the case
because the court needed to determine whether the Twitchells should have
acted differently. 69 Extensive trial testimony 70 provided conflicting evidence
of Robyn's condition during the days before his death.71 Testimony revealed
that "the child showed symptoms of serious illness-he was not eating, he
was 'moaning in pain' and, at one point, vomited a foul substance that may
pneumonia of her 5-year-old daughter because conventional medical care was not sought."
Religion Rejected as Murder Defense, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
62. Hirsley, supra note 5, § 2, at 8, col. 1.
63. 1A.
64. Id. at 12, col. 2 (statement of Rep. McIntyre).
65. Trial on Death, supra note 11, at A3, col. 1.
66. Parents'Faith, Children's Lives, Wash. Post, July 7, 1990, at A22, col. 1 (editorial).
67. Goodrich, Twitchell Case: Experts, Eyewitnesses Testify, Christian Sci. Monitor, May
21, 1990, at 8, col. 2.
68. Higgins, supra note 28, at 30, col. 3. One juror "believe[d] church leaders should have
been found liable in Robyn's death, too." English, A Juror's View of the Twitchells, Boston
Globe, July 18, 1990, at 17, col. I [hereinafter A Juror's View]. For a discussion of imposing
liability on religious faith healers as a deterrent effect, see Note, "Suffer the Little Children
... .: Toward a Judicial Recognition of a Duty of Reasonable Care Owed Children by Religious
Faith Healers, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 165, 169 (1987).
69. Jury Convicts, supra note 6, at A12, col. 4.
70. Estimates of the cost of the trial transcripts were $30,000 to $40,000. Telephone inter-
view with Clerk of Court, Massachusetts Superior Court, Boston, Massachusetts (Sept. 17,
1990).
71. Parents Who Relied, supra note 17, at A4, col. 4.
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have been his feces. ' ' 7 2 Abrasions on his lips and chin were probably due to
acid in his vomit.73 "His scrotum and about 15 inches of his bowel were jet
black because the blood supply had been cut off. He was so dehydrated that
his skin stayed up when pinched. A surgeon testified for the prosecution
that Robyn's screams must have been ear-splitting.",7 4 However, "other wit-
nesses, including the Christian Science 'practitioner' who cared for the boy,
said his condition was alternately better and worse and that he appeared to
be much better on the last day of his life, shortly before he died in his fa-
ther's arms."" David and Ginger Twitchell also testified that although
Robyn was feverish and lethargic, they believed he was recovering. The
Twitchells, however, admitted that Robyn went into convulsions the night
he died.76 Prosecution and defense experts disagreed about when the bowel
obstruction occurred. Experts for the prosecution maintained that the ob-
struction occurred several days before Robyn's death,77 while the defense
experts testified that the obstruction occurred less than twenty-four hours
before death.7
David Twitchell's testimony was considered the most dramatic in the
trial. When he was called, Robyn's father stated: "[I]f medicine could have
saved him, I wish I had turned to it."' 79 He further testified that despite his
faith in the healing power of prayer, he would have taken Robyn to a hospi-
tal if Robyn had shown life-threatening symptoms.80 "If I try a method of
care I think is working... I will stick with that. If I think it's not working,
I will try something else."'" David Twitchell's testimony might also have
72. Id.
73. Swan, Speaking Out: Should Government Rule When Faith, Science Clash?, L.A.
Times, July 14, 1990, at F16, col. 1.
74. Id. The Christian Science nurse stated that she had never heard Robyn scream or
express pain. Goodrich, supra note 67, at 8, col. 2; Goodrich, Prosecution Cross-Examines
David Twitchell on Care Chosen for Son Who Died, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 11, 1990, at 9,
cols. 3-4 (neighbors stating "that they heard no moaning, screaming, or crying during the time
that [Robyn] was sick."). But see Goodrich, Prosecution Likely to Rest Case Today in Twitch-
ell Trial, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 29, 1990, at 7, col. 4 (neighbors testified that the week-
end before Robyn's death the moaning and screaming was so loud that they had to close their
window to sleep).
75. Parents Who Relied, supra note 17, at A4, col. 5.
76. Botsford, supra note 11.
77. Goodrich, Prosecution Plans Rebuttal as Twitchell Trial Continues, Christian Sci.
Monitor, June 18, 1990, at 9, col. 3.
78. Id. Defense expert Dr. Edward Sussman, chief of pathology at Worcester City Hospi-
tal in Massachusetts, had "obtained a history of Robyn's illness from the parents, which prose-
cution medical experts did not do." He added that "an accurate history is one of the most
important factors in correctly interpreting autopsy findings." Id.
79. Jury Convicts, supra note 6, at A12, col. 4.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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been the most damaging to his case. One juror stated that "when David
Twitchell said that on the fifth day of the illness, he was scared because he'd
never seen his son vomit so violently, that's when we all believed a reason-
able person would have taken him to a doctor."82
Another central issue in the case was whether conventional medical care
could have saved Robyn. The defense argued that "a bowel obstruction is an
elusive medical problem presenting symptoms that can fool even experienced
doctors., 8 3 Yet, the defense was likely undermined by evidence showing
that both David and Ginger Twitchell had previously consulted doctors for
their own ailments. David Twitchell admitted that he had consulted a den-
tist in 1983 when prayer did not alleviate a toothache; the dentist performed
a root canal and administered Novocain. 4 The evidence also showed that
Ginger Twitchell had received pain-killing medication during childbirth. 5
The prosecutor capitalized on these facts during his closing argument, ask-
ing, "[w]hat allows them to use a doctor for themselves and not for their boy
... ? Where do they justify that? No one can justify that."816
IV. FREE EXERCISE CLAIM ANALYSIS
A. Parents' Free Exercise Claim
Prior to its April 1990 decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 7 the Supreme Court of the United States had consistently
held that the free exercise clause could be a valid defense to laws generally
applicable to the public.88 This was recognized in a 1972 decision, Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 9 where the Court stated that "there are areas of conduct protected
82. A Juror's View, supra note 68.
83. Trial on Death, supra note 11, at A3, col. 5. One news report stated: "No one in the
court has suggested that conventional medicine would have saved Robyn; no one can." Bot-
sford, supra note 11, at 18, col. 8.
84. Trial on Death, supra note 11, at A3, col. 6.
85. Id.
86. Id. Christian Scientists customarily consult physicians in "gray areas," such as re-
ceiving dental treatment, setting broken bones, getting eyeglasses, and having a doctor or mid-
wife attend childbirth. Sege, Overcoming a Test of Faith, Boston Globe, Aug. 8, 1990, at 1, col.
2, at 16, col. 6. This was exactly the argument of the Twitchell prosecutor.
87. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
88. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (invalidating unemployment com-
pensation statute as applied to member of Seventh Day Adventist church who would not ac-
cept employment that required her to work on her sabbath, Saturday); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish
parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school); Thomas v. Review
Bd. Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (invalidating unemployment compensation stat-
utes as applied to member of Jehovah's Witness who would not accept transfer to department
which produced fabricated turrets for military tanks).
89. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the
power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicabil-
ity. ' 99 Consistent with this principle, in 1981 the Court required the Gov-
ernment in Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Empl. Sec. Div.91 to justify a
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling state interest. 92 In other actions, the Court has
refused to allow the state to assert a vague or speculative interest,93 since, if
the competing interests are not compared "on the same plane," the issue
may be decided in advance by the way the question is stated. 94 Against this
backdrop of applying strict scrutiny to laws implicating the free exercise
clause, the Court's decision in Smith signals a retreat from traditional free
exercise analysis. 9
5
The respondents in Smith were dismissed by a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they ingested peyote as part of the religious ceremonies
90. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.
91. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
92. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-19 ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.");
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 406 (The question is "whether some compelling state interest ... justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right."); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (commenting that "such infringements must
be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling
interest."); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (noting that prior decisions have required
a showing of a compelling state interest before refusing to grant religions exemptions); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) ("The State may justify a limitation on religious
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding interest.").
93. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719 (no evidence in record to support government's alleged
interest); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (state's interest must be specific as applied to the case; general
yet otherwise valid interests are insufficient); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 (no evidence in record
to support government's alleged interest).
94. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943). It has been sug-
gested that
[t]he purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another of the funda-
mental concerns of government: public health and safety, public peace and order,
defense, revenue. To measure an individual interest directly against one of these
rarified values inevitably makes the individual interest appear the less significant.
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 330-31 (1969).
95. This retreat from the free exercise clause analysis as discussed above was foreshad-
owed by other recent Supreme Court cases. See generally Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971) (Court held the exemption in the Military Secret Service Act was valid only if all
wars were against person's religious beliefs, not if just one particular war violated those be-
liefs); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Court held that Amish were required to pay
social security taxes notwithstanding their religious convictions against it).
Commonwealth v. Twitchell
at a Native American church.96 They were subsequently denied unemploy-
ment compensation under a state law disqualifying employees discharged for
work-related misconduct.9 7 After distinguishing previous precedent," the
Court held that when the free exercise clause is implicated by itself, a reli-
gious belief may not excuse breaches of generally applicable and even-
handedly applied criminal statutes.99 By distinguishing previous decisions,
the Smith Court did not completely abandon its traditional analysis, noting
that there were "hybrid" situations in which the free exercise clause would
continue to bar application of a neutral, generally applicable law." ° The
majority reasoned that while "a non-discriminatory religious-practice ex-
emption is permitted, or even desired, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required.' 1 °1 Thus, as with other recent Supreme Court decisions,1 2 the
states may determine for themselves whether to enact an exemption for Na-
tive Americans, so that use of peyote in religious ceremonies will not result
in criminal prosecution.
10 3
The Smith decision may be seen as creating two standards for free exercise
analysis. Under the first standard, the state may, if it chooses and if only the
96. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597-98
(1990).
97. Id. at 1598.
98. Previous cases were distinguished on two grounds. First, those cases involved protec-
tion under the free exercise clause in conjunction with other constitutional protection. Id. at
1601. Second, unlike the "generally applicable prohibitions" in the case at hand, the balancing
test used in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963), was "developed in a context that
lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
99. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
100. See id. at 1602. Justice Blackmun dissented, stating that the majority decision "effec-
tuate[d] a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning" the free exercise clause. Id. at 1616
(Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1606 (emphasis supplied).
102. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2855-56 (1990)
(states may allow substituted judgment to determine whether life sustaining elements will be
withdrawn); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2944 (1990) (states may require parental
consent for minors to obtain abortions). In addition, when the Department of Health and
Human Services removed the religious exemption requirement (originally resulting in exemp-
tions for faith healers), it stated that no policy shift was intended. HHS merely intended to
allow states to determine whether faith healing constituted neglect. Comment, When Rights
Clash, supra note 5, at 592-93. For further discussion of the religious exemptions, see supra
notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
103. "In fact, the federal government and 23 states have exempted religious use of peyote
from criminal prohibitions .. " Fein & Reynolds, On Faith and Law: Secular Encyclical,
Legal Times, June 18, 1990, at 18, col. 1, at 20, col. 1 (editorial); see also Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1606 ("It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their
drug laws for sacramental peyote use.").
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free exercise clause is implicated, exempt from criminal prosecution those
who practice spiritual healing.
Under the second standard, a hybrid situation would bar the application
of a neutral, generally applicable law. The hybrid analysis is triggered when
the' free exercise right is implicated in conjunction with another constitu-
tional right." Providing examples of possible hybrid situations, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Smith majority, stated, in dicta:
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a
free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity
or parental right. . . . There being no contention that Oregon's
drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children
in those beliefs . 1...'05
Furthermore, in the context of the rights of parents to direct the education
of their children," °6 Justice Scalia stated:
The Court's holding in Pierce [v. Society of Sisters,.107] stands as a
charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of
their children. And, when the interests of parenthood are com-
bined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this rec-
ord, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the valid-
ity of the State's requirements under the First Amendment.'" 8
As the Twitchell appeal" is considered in the post-Smith environment, it
is possible for the Twitchells to argue that their case presents a hybrid situa-
tion. The Twitchells may contend that they have a parental interest in di-
recting their child's religious upbringing and that this interest is especially
104. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601-02
(1990).
105. Id. at 1602 (emphasis supplied).
106. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.").
107. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
108. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601 n. 1 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 403
U.S. 205, 233 (1972), where the Court invalidated a compulsory school attendance law as it
applied to Amish parents, refusing on religious grounds, to send their children to school).
109. Whether the Twitchell case itself will reach the Supreme Court remains to be seen.
However, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court let stand a dismissal by the Michigan
Court of Appeals in a similar case involving Christian Scientists by denying a writ of certiorari.
Brown v. Laitner, 432 Mich. 861, 435 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 326 (1989); see also
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989). And, in a recent decision in another Christian Science case, the Second
District Court of Appeals in Florida did not find the Smith hybrid analysis to be controlling.
Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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valid during a child's early and formative years."' By administering faith
healing to their son during his illness, the Twitchells may argue that they
were "directing the religious upbringing of their children" and "raising their
children in those beliefs." Thus, by asserting both their parental right to
direct the upbringing of their children and their first amendment right to
exercise freely their religion, the Twitchells may satisfy the Smith hybrid
requirement. From this, the Twitchells can argue that they should be ex-
empt from prosecution.
The success of a Twitchell hybrid argument, however, may be limited by
their parental right claim. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' the Court indicated that
"the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
subject to limitation ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child."'1 12 This statement could restrict the
Twitchells' use of the hybrid analysis since there can be no doubt that the
health or safety of Robyn Twitchell was jeopardized by his parents' acts or
omissions.
Yoder's qualification of protected parental rights may weaken the claims
of Christian Science parents like the Twitchells. Likewise, the facts of Yoder
present a more compelling scenario than Twitchell. The Amish parents in
Yoder, for example, believed that they would both "expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community" and "endanger their own
salvation and that of their children."" 3 In contrast, David and Ginger
Twitchell, according to news reports, did not believe they would have been
censured by their church if they had resorted to conventional medical treat-
ment for their son," 4 nor is there any indication that they believed their
salvation, or their child's, was jeopardized." 5
Yet, despite these differences, Yoder and Twitchell implicate similar prin-
ciples. The Court in Yoder was concerned with the "impact that compul-
sory high school attendance could have on the continued survival of Amish
communities."' 6 This survival argument could also be made for Christian
Scientists: They vehemently assert that without faith healing there is no
Christian Science religion." 7 In addition, the underlying law in Yoder and
in Twitchell, by threatening parents with criminal sanctions, affirmatively
110. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (the critical question is who deter-
mines the limitations on parents-the legislature or the judiciary).
111. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
112. Id. at 233-34.
113. Id. at 209.
114. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
117. Trial on Death, supra note 11.
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compels both sects "to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental
tenets of their religious beliefs.""'
B. Child's Free Exercise Claim
On appeal, the Twitchells assert that their oldest child Jeremy's free exer-
cise of religion is being hindered. "[I]t's as much his choice now as it is ours,
and this infringes on his choice, because he's a minor under us, so he's bound
by the judge's decision. He wasn't on trial.""' 9 In a recently decided Flor-
ida case, 20 the convicted Christian Science parents stated the same concern
to a friend paying a condolence visit: The child "fully knew that the choice
was hers, whether to live or die .... [She] glimpsed something from the
other world, and she wanted that more than she wanted this world."''
Even the prosecution in Twitchell, by asking "What religion [is] the
baby?,"' 22 has recognized this issue.
According to the Yoder dicta,'23 the child's religion is presumptively the
parents' religion because the parents are entitled to "direct the religious up-
bringing of their children."' 2 4 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that parents will
raise their child in their own beliefs. This parental guidance and control is
not unusual: Parents make many decisions for their children until they are
able to make decisions for themselves, or until the law, by declaring the child
emancipated, removes the parents' legal ability to make decisions for their
children. Accordingly, the state is placed in a precarious position because if
the parents are not allowed to "direct the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren,"' 125 then the state is de facto doing so and is thus violating the child's
right to exercise freely his religion. ' 2 6 The majority in Yoder touched on this
issue only peripherally.' 27 The dissent in Yoder argued that "if an Amish
child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to have that desire
118. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
119. Marks, Couple Keeps the Faith, Christian Scientist to Honor God-and Court, News-
day, Aug. 5, 1990, at 6, col. 2.
120. Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
121. Dolnick, When Faith and Medicine Collide, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1990, at ZI4, col. 1.
122. Trial on Death, supra note 11, at A3, col. 5.
123. See supra text accompanying note 108.
124. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 n.1
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 403 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
125. Id.
126. However, by classifying the child's interests in faith healing not as protecting the
child's rights (which are not coequal to an adult's, except in limited circumstances) but as
protecting the child's welfare, the state can justify restricting a child's free choice, even when
the child chooses to assert his free exercise right. Comment, When Rights Clash, supra note 5,
at 606. In addition, the court could be violating the establishment clause. See supra note 16.
127. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231.
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respected, the State may well be able to override the parents' religiously mo-
tivated objections."128 The majority, however, did not consider that point,
as it was not at issue in that case. 12 9 Neither was the issue reached in
Twitchell; since Robyn was only two years old and, even assuming he would
have wanted to receive conventional medical care, he could not have ex-
pressed that desire.
V. CONCLUSION
Commonwealth v. Twitchell extends the parens patriae power of the state
further than ever before. The case is also reported and promoted as a case
asserting children's rights.13' This assertion, however, is not entirely accu-
rate since it does not address the fundamental principle at stake: Who
"owns" the child and who will determine what (including religion) is in the
child's best interest. Will it be the state or the parents? One report stated
that Americans were "being asked to judge between David and Ginger as
parents and the state as guardians of any future children such as Robyn." 
1 3 1
Because of the death of Robyn Twitchell, some may be reluctant to recog-
nize that Twitchell threatens both parental rights and religious freedom.
Yet, allowing the state to usurp the exercise of parental responsibility is not
the answer. Whether parents choose to forego conventional medical treat-
ment for either religious or non-religious reasons, their wishes should be
honored, just as parental decisions are honored in many other areas. Parent-
ing offers no guarantees. Parents make choices daily that will influence their
children for better or worse. Sometimes parents make the wrong choice.
When that happens, no one suffers more than the parents themselves. Be-
cause the choices are complex and difficult, "shouldn't we ask whether the
[Twitchell] result is a more free and loving society or another step toward an
authoritarian state?"
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Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing inter-
ests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in
which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are
preventing their minor children from attending high school despite their expressed
desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the state in such a proceeding
would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the
religious upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court's
past decisions.
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